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I. INTRODUCTION 
Germany’s atrocious treatment of persons with disabilities in the first 
half of the twentieth century is a dark chapter in its history.1 Within six 
months of taking power in 1933, Adolf Hitler and his Nazi regime initiated 
a genocide against persons with disabilities, portraying them as having 
“lives unworthy of living” and subjecting them to tremendous human 
rights violations.2 One of Hitler’s first initiatives was to enact compulsory 
sterilization laws to prevent “genetically diseased offspring.”3 The 1935 
Nuremberg Laws prohibited persons with disabilities from marrying and 
thus furthered the dehumanization of persons with disabilities.4 By the late 
1930s, such laws and negative propaganda fostered the general public 
perception that having a disability justified murder.5 In 1939, the 
government initiated the year of the “duty to be healthy,” an extermination 
program for children with disabilities.6 Euthanasia programs for adults 
 1.  See Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities art. 1, Dec. 13, 
2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD] (defining “persons with disabilities” as 
“those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments 
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others”). 
 2.  Mark P. Mostert, Useless Eaters: Disabilities as Genocide Marker in Nazi 
Germany, 36 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 155, 159-60 (2002). 
 3.  Id. at 159. 
 4.  See id. (discussing the Marriage Health Law, which banned marriage for 
anyone with a mental disability, “hereditary disease,” or contagious disease) 
(internal quotation mark omitted).  
 5.  See id. at 160 (stating that by the late 1930s, Nazi officials received mercy 
killing requests, particularly from parents of newborns and young infants with 
severe disabilities). 
 6.  Id. at 161. 
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followed shortly.7 These programs subjected people with intellectual, 
emotional, and physical disabilities to the mass destruction techniques later 
used in the Nazi concentration camps.8 Ultimately, over 80,000 adults with 
disabilities died at the hands of the Nazi regime.9 
The International Bill of Human Rights, composed of the three human 
rights treaties that emerged after World War II,10 the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (“UDHR”),11 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”),12 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”),13 is remarkably silent on the rights 
of persons with disabilities. The UDHR was adopted in 1948 to condemn 
the human rights violations that occurred during World War II and the Nazi 
era and to prevent them from recurring.14 Nevertheless, while article 2 of 
UDHR stipulates that all human beings are entitled to the rights contained 
in the instrument “without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status,” disabilities are not explicitly referenced.15 
Similarly, neither the ICCPR  nor the ICESCR explicitly address the rights 
of persons with disabilities.16 Consequently, these legal instruments 
collectively ensured disability remained “an invisible element of 
international human rights law” for the last half of the twentieth century.17 
 7.  See id. 162-63 (asserting the State permitted doctors to grant a “mercy 
death” for persons with “incurable” diseases). 
 8.  See id. at 164 (explaining that hundreds of asylum inmates would be sent 
to killing centers, placed in gas chambers, and cremated once they were dead). 
 9.  Id. at 165. 
 10.  THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 3 (Paul Williams, ed., 1981). 
 11.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 12.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 13.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 14.  See ELIZABETH WICKS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
38 (2010) (discussing the historical context surrounding the adoption of the UDHR 
and emphasizing that the Holocaust was the most important factor in shaping its 
content). 
 15.  UDHR, supra note 11, art. 2 (“Furthermore, no distinction shall be made 
on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or 
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”).  
 16.  See ICCPR, supra note 12; ICESCR, supra note 13. 
 17.  Rosemary Kayees & Philipp French, Out of Darkness and Into Light?: 
Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. 
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Yet, studies and statistics from UN agencies relating to the treatment of 
persons with disabilities reveal that such individuals continue to experience 
arbitrary and unfavorable treatment around the globe.18 In an attempt to 
improve this situation, in December 2006, the UN General Assembly 
adopted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(“CRPD”)19 and its Optional Protocol to promote the “full and effective 
participation and inclusion” of persons with disabilities in society.20 Under 
this treaty, State parties must guarantee that persons with disabilities are 
treated equally and not discriminated against on the basis of their 
disability.21 
The right to non-discrimination and full inclusion in society 
encompasses the fundamental right to participate in political life, which  
requires that persons with disabilities have the right to vote on equal footing 
with others.22 Article 25(b) of the ICCPR provides that every citizen shall 
RTS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008); cf. Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 
CALIF. L.REV. 75, 80-81 (2007) (“Although disability is not specifically mentioned 
in any of these treaties, they technically include all human beings within their 
respective provinces.”). 
 18.  See Some Facts about Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 
14-25, 2006), http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/pdfs/factsheet.pdf (setting 
forth that in some countries the unemployment rate for disabled people is almost 
eighty percent, that twenty percent of the world’s poorest people are disabled, and 
that ninety percent of children with disabilities in developing countries do not 
attend school); see also Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Implications for the Rights of Elderly 
People Under International Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 527, 540 (2009) (asserting 
that the CRPD was enacted because states and the rest of the international 
community were ignoring persons with disabilities). 
 19.  See CRPD, supra note 1, pmbl. (“[R]ecognizing also that discrimination 
against any person on the basis of disability is a violation of the inherent dignity 
and worth of the human person.”). 
 20.  Id. art. 3(c). 
 21.  See id. art. 5 (“States Parties shall prohibit all discrimination on the basis 
of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effective legal 
protection against discrimination on all grounds.”). 
 22.  Theresia Degener, Address at the 4th Conference of the State Party: The 
Right to Political Participation in Context of Disability (Art. 29 CRPD) 1 (Sept. 7-
9, 2011) [hereinafter Degener, The Right to Political Participation]; Theresia 
Degener, The Right to Political Participation: From Exclusion to Universality, 
INT’L DISABILITY ALLIANCE HUM. RTS. PUBLICATION, Mar. 2013, at 1 [hereinafter 
Degener, From Exclusion to Universality], available at http://www.international 
disabilityalliance.org/sites/disalliance.e-presentaciones.net/files/public/files/ 
Theresia%20Degener_The%20right%20to%20political%20participation_from%20
exclusion%20to%20universality.pdf (asserting that the right to political 
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have the right to vote by equal suffrage “without unreasonable 
restrictions.”23 Article 29(a)(iii) of the CRPD explicitly extends this right to 
persons with disabilities, setting out that State parties must guarantee 
persons with disabilities the right to “effectively and fully participate” in 
political life on an “equal basis with others” and guarantee the “free 
expression” of their will as electors.24 
As a party to the CRPD and its optional protocol25 and to the ICCPR,26 
Germany is obligated to allow persons with disabilities to participate in 
political life on an equal basis with others by granting them the right to 
vote.27 Nonetheless, section 13(2) of the German Federal Elections Law 
(“FEL”) provides that a person “shall be disqualified from voting if . . . a 
custodian has been appointed . . . to attend to all [his] affairs.”28 
Consequently, persons in Germany who are under court-ordered full 
custodianship are automatically deprived of the right to vote. 
This article assesses whether section 13(2) of the FEL complies with 
international human rights standards relating to persons with disabilities. 
Section II analyzes the legal status of persons under full custodianship in 
participation is at the very “heart of democracy”). 
 23.  ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 25(b). 
 24.  CRPD, supra note 1, art. 29(a)(iii)-(b). 
 25.  Gesetz zu dem Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen vom 13. 
Dezember 2006 über die Rechte von Menschen mit Behinderungen sowie zu dem 
Fakultativprotokoll vom 13. Dezember 2006 zum Übereinkommen der Vereinten 
Nationen über die Rechte von Menschen mit Behinderungen [German CRPD 
Implementing Legislation], Dec. 21, 2008, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL II [BGBL. 
II] at 1419 (Ger.) (implementing the CRPD under German legislation).  
 26.  Gesetz zu dem Internationalen Pakt vom 19. Dezember 1966 über 
bürgerliche und politische Rechte [German ICCPR Implementing Legislation], 
Nov. 15, 1973, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL II [BGBL. II] at 1533 (Ger.) 
(implementing the ICCPR under German legislation).  
 27.  See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 29 (imposing on States the duty to guarantee 
persons with disabilities the right to participate in political and public life); ICCPR, 
supra note 12, art. 25 (obliging states to allow every citizen to enjoy the right to 
take part in public affairs, to vote, and to be elected in public elections). 
 28.  Bundeswahlgesetz [BWG] [Federal Elections Act], Jul. 23, 1993, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] at 1288, as amended, § 13, para. 2 (Ger.), 
translated in Federal Elections Act (BWG), BUNDESWAHLLEITER, 
http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/downloads/rechtsgrundlage
n/bundeswahlgesetz_engl.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). The official German 
legislation uses the male form (“his”) but refers to both male and female. In the 
interest of simplicity, this article will similarly use “his” to refer to both males and 
females, unless otherwise stated. See id. (using both “his” and “her” in the English 
translation). 
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Germany with respect to the right to vote.29 Section III examines whether 
section 13(2) of the FEL is in accordance with modern international human 
rights law relating to disabilities and concludes that it is inconsistent.30 
Section IV identifies the future conduct required to ensure that German 
electoral legislation complies with international human rights laws on 
disabilities at the national and international level.31 Section V concludes 
that while disability rights have become more visible at the international 
level since the CRPD was adopted, the German example illustrates that 
States need to ensure that treaty provisions, particularly article 29, are 
sufficiently implemented at the national level.32 Substantial changes to the 
electoral participation of persons with disabilities are only possible if State 
parties fully and effectively implement article 29 of the CRPD into their 
national law. 
II. THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN GERMANY FOR 
PERSONS UNDER FULL CUSTODIANSHIP 
Germany considers the right to vote a “cornerstone” of modern 
parliamentary democracy.33 The German Constitution states that every 
citizen who is at least eighteen years of age is guaranteed the right to vote 
in federal elections.34 Elections in Germany must be general, direct, free, 
 29.  See discussion infra Section II (illustrating that the government 
automatically excludes persons under full custodianship from the right to vote on 
the basis of their disability). 
 30.  See discussion infra Section III (arguing that excluding all persons under 
full custodianship from voting without proof of their individual ability to make 
rational voting decisions is not reasonable but discriminatory, and thus violates 
international law). 
 31.  See discussion infra Section IV (asserting that German legislation should 
be amended to reflect the international human rights standard as contained in 
article 25 of the ICCPR and article 29 of the CRPD, which requires that all persons 
under full custodianship have the right to vote regardless of whether they can 
exercise their right rationally or not, but also expressing concern that Germany is 
unlikely to amend its legislation in the near future). 
 32.  See discussion infra Section V. 
 33.  See PETER JAMES, THE GERMAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM 1, 9 (2003) 
(describing how Germany guaranteed the right to vote for bankrupts and extended 
the right to women in the Weimar Republic for the first time in German history in 
1918 in an attempt at establishing a democratic system). 
 34.  GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] 
[GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBL. I at 1, art. 38(2) (Ger.), translated in 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ 
UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/ 
basic_law_for_the_federal_republic_of_germany.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).  
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equal, and secret.35 Moreover, all citizens can equally exercise the right to 
vote and their votes count equally.36 
While equality in elections is constitutionally guaranteed in Germany, 
this does not mean that the government cannot exclude certain groups from 
voting.37 The German Constitutional Court has held that differentiating 
between certain groups of people is permissible for “compelling reasons.”38 
According to section 13(2) of the FEL, persons with court-appointed legal 
custodians are automatically disqualified from voting.39 Courts can order 
full custodianship only when a person cannot take care of all of his affairs 
“due to mental illness or a physical, mental or psychological handicap.”40 
Where a person cannot take care of certain affairs of his life, such as 
finances, residence, or health care, the court does not place the person 
under full custodianship but appoints a custodian for those particular 
 35.  Id. art. 38(1). 
 36.  See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
Feb. 13, 2008, 120 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 
[BVERFGE] 82 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal 
 Constitutional Court] Nov. 23, 1988, 79 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
 BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 161 (Ger.).  
 37.  See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
Sept. 29, 1990, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3001 (3002), 1990 
(Ger.) (guaranteeing that equality in voting does not mean that the voting 
procedure cannot be subject to regulations by the legislature); 
 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 5, 1952, 
1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 208 (248) 
(Ger.). 
 38.  NJW 3001 (3002) (Ger.) (“[Z]wingenden grundes”]; 1 BVERFGE 208 
(248) (Ger.) (“[Z]wingenden Grund”). 
 39.  Federal Elections Act, supra note 28. 
 40.  BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, § 1896, para. 1 (Ger.), translated 
in German Civil Code BGB, Bundesministerium der Justiz und für 
Verbraucherschutz, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/german_ 
civil_code.pdf (“If a person of full age, by reason of a mental illness or a physical, 
mental or psychological handicap, cannot in whole or in part take care of his 
affairs, the custodianship court . . . appoints a custodian for him.”); see GERO BIEG, 
JURIS PRAXIS KOMMENTAR BGB § 1896, para. 68 (6th ed. 2012) (Ger.) (referring 
to full custodianship as “Totalbetreuung” and discussing the effects of granting 
such custodianship); Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht [BayObLG] [Bavarian 
Higher Regional Court] Mar. 12, 1997, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS GESAMTE 
FAMILIENRECHT [FAMRZ] 452  1998 (Ger.) (providing that similar norms exist 
excluding persons with disabilities from voting in local, regional, and European 
elections).  
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affairs.41 Section 13(2) of the FEL does not affect such persons and thus 
protects their right to vote.42 Persons who would be subject to full 
custodianship because of the extent of their disability but who choose to 
privately appoint an individual to take over their affairs through a power of 
attorney are also outside the scope of section 13(2) of the  FEL.43 The 
German Constitutional Court has not declared section 13(2) of the FEL 
unconstitutional.44 This may suggest that German courts find a “compelling 
reason” to treat persons under full custodianship differently with respect to 
the right to vote.45 
The following section also analyzes whether section 13(2) of the FEL 
currently complies with international human rights laws relating to 
disabilities before considering whether, and in what way, the German 
Parliament would have to amend the legislation to meet international 
human rights standards. 
III. GERMANY’S COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON 
DISABILITY 
Prior to the adoption of the CRPD in 2006, no legally binding 
international instrument specifically relating to persons with disabilities 
existed at the international level.46 Nevertheless, the right to vote under 
article 25(b) of the ICCPR is a fundamental human right applicable to 
every individual, including persons with disabilities and those under full 
 41.  CIVIL CODE, supra note 40, § 1896, para. 2 (“A custodian may be 
appointed only for groups of tasks in which the custodianship is necessary.”); 
FAMRZ 452, 452-53, 1998 (Ger.); see BIEG, supra note 40. 
 42.  See Federal Elections Act, supra note 28 (excluding only those under full 
custodianship from voting); see also BIEG, supra note 40. 
 43.  See Federal Elections Act, supra note 28 (excluding only those who were 
appointed a custodian). 
 44.  See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] June 23, 1999, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1593 (1594) 
(Ger.) (dismissing the case on admissibility grounds and therefore not deciding the 
question of whether being placed under full custodianship automatically excludes a 
person from the right to vote pursuant to § 1896 of the Civil Code); 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 29, 1984, 
67 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 146, 146-
48 (Ger.) (stating that this was also the case under the old guardianship laws). 
 45.  See discussion infra Section III (analyzing the two justifications of the 
German government to exclude persons under full custodianship from voting). 
 46.  See supra Section I. 
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custodianship.47 The right to vote is the backbone of democracy and thus 
article 25(b) allows restricting the right only to the extent such restrictions 
are not “unreasonable.”48 While the treaty does not define “unreasonable 
restrictions,”49 the United Nations Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), 
which was established to interpret the norms of the ICCPR and monitor its 
compliance, assessed the meaning of “unreasonable restrictions” in its 
General Comment 25 (“Comment 25”).50 The HRC concluded that “every 
citizen”51 should have the right to vote without distinctions between 
citizens in the enjoyment of the rights on grounds of “race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth 
or other status.”52 However, the HRC noted that States may restrict the 
right to vote but only if the conditions are based on “objective” and 
“reasonable” criteria and established by law.53 Whether Germany complies 
with article 25(b) of the ICCPR depends on whether full custodianship 
represents an “objective” and “reasonable” criterion to justify automatically 
excluding persons with disabilities from voting. 
A. THE OBJECTIVITY AND REASONABLENESS OF USING FULL 
CUSTODIANSHIP AS AN AUTOMATIC BAR TO VOTING 
The German political discourse and academic scholarship propose two 
rationales for satisfying the “objective” and “reasonable” criterion to 
automatically exclude persons under full custodianship from voting. First, 
persons under full custodianship are justifiably excluded from voting 
 47.  See ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 25(b) (setting forth that every citizen 
possesses the right “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status”). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See id. 
 50.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm’r, CCPR General Comment No. 25: 
Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote): The Right to 
Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to 
Public Service, ¶¶ 3-4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (July 12, 1996) 
[hereinafter CCPR General Comment 25] (asserting that restricting the right to 
vote must be limited and based on both objective and reasonable criteria). See 
generally Human Rights Committee, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2014) (providing 
more information on the work of the HRC). 
 51.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 52.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. 
 53.  See id. ¶ 4 (setting forth examples of objective and reasonable limitations 
on the right to vote, such as age requirements and mental incapacity). 
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because they are unable to make rational voting decisions and would 
effectively diminish the quality of election results. Second, allowing 
persons under full custodianship the right to vote would increase the risk of 
vote manipulation and undermine the integrity of the electoral process. 
Neither of these justifications is “reasonable” or “objective.” Germany’s 
exclusion of persons with disabilities from voting is arbitrary and 
discriminatory. 
1. Disenfranchisement of Persons Under Full Custodianship Because 
They Are Ipso Facto Unfit to Vote and Would Endanger the 
Functioning of Democracy 
The German Government  proposed that excluding persons under full 
custodianship from voting is “objective” and “reasonable” because such 
persons are per se unable to make rational voting decisions.54 
Commentators suggest that “rational” voters are better able to select 
government officials than “irrational” voters, such as those under full 
custodianship.55 They reason that permitting those who make “irrational” 
voting decisions to vote could endanger the functioning of democracy 
because only those capable of making rational voting decisions select 
government officials who secure more operational governments.56 The 
 54.  See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT], 
Oct. 19, 2011, 17/132 (15636) (Ger.) (justifying how FEL complies with the 
CRPD on this ground); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND 
PROTOKOLLE [BT], Nov. 8, 2008, 16/10808 (63-64) (Ger.) (discussing this 
 rationalization when drafting Germany’s implementing legislation of the CRPD); 
BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR ARBEIT UND SOZIALES, UNSER WEG IN EINE INKLUSIVE 
GESELLSCHAFT - DER NATIONALE AKTIONSPLAN DER BUNDESREGIERUNG ZUR 
UMSETZUNG DER UN-BEHINDERTENRECHTSKONVENTION 86 (2011) (Ger.), 
 available at http://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/PDF-Publikationen/ 
a740-nationaler-aktionsplan-barrierefrei.pdf?__blob=publicationFile; see also 
LEANDER PALLEIT, GLEICHES WAHLRECHT FÜR ALLE? MENSCHEN MIT 
BEHINDERUNGEN UND DAS WAHLRECHT IN DEUTSCHLAND 11-12 (2011) (Ger.), 
available at http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/uploads/tx_commerce/ 
policy_paper_18_gleiches_wahlrecht_fuer_alle.pdf (discussing the objective 
reasoning behind excluding persons under full custodianship from voting).  
 55.  Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644, 1653 
(1979); see also Heinrich Lang, Stellungnahme zur Anhörung im Innenausschuss, 
Jun. 3 2013, AUSSCHUSSDRUCKSACHEN [AD] 17(4)744 F, 5 (Ger.).  
 56.  Lang, Stellungnahme, supra note 55, at 5 (explaining that excluding voters 
who, due to their disabilities, are unable to exercise their right to vote properly is 
non-discriminatory in at least certain cases); see Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 4, 2012, 132 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 39, 40(Ger.) (finding that creating a 
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German Government has confirmed that this sufficiently justifies excluding 
persons under full custodianship from voting.57 However, this rationale is 
neither “reasonable” nor “objective.” 
The assumption that all persons under full custodianship are unable to 
make rational voting decisions and thus endanger the functioning of 
democracy is not “reasonable” for two reasons. First, it is indiscriminately 
based on stereotypes and preconceived ideas of the political understanding 
of persons with certain biological and psychological conditions.58 Although 
section 13(2) of the FEL automatically withdraws the right to vote when a 
person is placed under full custodianship, the court granting full 
custodianship does not assess whether the person is actually fit to vote. On 
the contrary, the court’s decision is solely based on whether the person 
requires legal representation in the conduct of his affairs. 59 Consequently, 
the automatic revocation of the right to vote is based on the assumed 
physical and cognitive constitution of a person, without positive affirmation 
of the individual’s fitness to vote.60 Ultimately the right to vote is 
withdrawn in the custodianship process even though no connection exists 
between ordering full custodianship and the right to vote.61 Paul 
functioning government and securing the integrity of the voting procedure are 
legitimate reasons for restricting voting rights).  
 57.  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT], Nov. 8, 
2008, 16/10808 (63-64) (Ger.).  
 58.  Sabine Jentsch, Behinderung und Politische Teilhabe, Paper Presented at 
University of Hamburg Lecture Series: Behinderung ohne Behinderte?! 
Perspektiven der Disability Studies 4, 9 (Dec. 10, 2012) (Ger.), transcript available 
at http://www.zedis-ev-hochschule-hh.de/files/jentsch_10122012.pdf (concluding 
that the exclusion of persons under custodianship from voting is not reasonable but 
arbitrary and not democratically justified).  
 59.  Hans Meyer, Stellungnahme zu den Wahlrechtsinitiativen, May 28 2013, 
AUSSCHUSSDRUCKSACHEN [AD] 17(4)744 A, 2 (Ger.); Bernd Schulte, Die UN-
Behindertenkonvention und der Ausschluss von Menschen mit Behinderung vom 
Wahlrecht, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 16, 18 (2012) (Ger.).  
 60.  Schulte, supra note 59, at 18; see Jentsch, Behinderung, supra note 58, at 7 
(noting that the government puts a physical disability on the same level as an 
inability to act and decide independently).  
 61.  BRK-Allianz – Ger. CRPD Alliance, Joint NGO submission: UPR 
regarding the Fed. Republic of Ger., 16th Sess., May 2013, 14, (Sep. 27, 2012) 
[hereinafter BRK-Allianz Submission], available at http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/ 
UPR/Documents/Session16/DE/js4_upr16_deu_s16_2013_jointsubmission4_e.pd; 
see Ulrich Hellmann, Der Ausschluss vom Wahlrecht im Betreuungsrecht - 
Handlungsbedarf für den Gesetzgeber, Discussion Paper 8/2012 for Deutsche 
Vereinigung für Rehabilitation Forum D – Entwicklungen und Reformvorschläge 
6 (May 11, 2012), (Ger.) (transcript available at http://www.reha-recht.de/file 
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Appelbaum confirms that a dominating societal view that persons with 
disabilities are “intrinsically irrational and incapable of participating in 
civic functions” has contributed to preventing such persons from exercising 
their right to vote in the US.62 
While the blanket exclusion of persons under full custodianship from 
voting has remained unchallenged in German jurisprudence, some scholars 
continue to criticize it. Bernd Schulte, for example, argues that people 
under full custodianship may be legally incapable but still have the capacity 
to understand the electoral process and act upon this understanding.63 He 
summarizes that affected individuals should not be excluded from the 
voting process purely because courts have placed them under full 
custodianship and contends that, if at all, judges should  address this issue 
on an individual basis.64 The above illustrates that excluding all persons 
under full custodianship from voting without proof of their individual 
ability to make rational voting decisions is not “reasonable” but 
discriminatory because it is based on stereotypical assumptions and 
preconceived ideas.65 
Second, excluding persons under custodianship from voting 
because they are unable to make rational voting decisions and thus 
endanger the functioning of democracy is not “reasonable.” The 
participation of those persons does not actually compromise democratic 
elections. The overall number of persons affected by the electoral 
legislation is relatively small, particularly because section 13(2) of the FEL 
only applies to persons under full custodianship and not those who have 
only been placed under custodianship for certain areas of life. Moreover, 
the threshold for imposing full custodianship is high. German courts 
customarily impose full custodianship only on people with extreme 
physical disabilities who also suffer from mental conditions, people 
suffering from dementia, and people in persistent vegetative states, such as 
admin/download/foren/d/2012/D82012_Wahlausschluss_im_Betreuungsrecht.pdf) 
(arguing that excluding persons under full custodianship from voting is arbitrary).  
 62.  Paul S. Appelbaum, “I Vote, I Count”: Mental Disability and the Right to 
Vote, 51 L. & PSYCHIATRY 849, 850 (2000). 
 63.  Schulte, supra note 59, at 16-17. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Individually assessing a person’s capacity to vote during the custodianship 
hearing would remedy this issue, but would not make the legislation comply with 
international human rights law. See discussion infra Section IV (arguing that 
individualized assessments are not an “objective” or “reasonable” criterion for 
denying persons with disabilities the right to vote). 
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comatose patients and persons with severe brain injuries.66 Yet, it has been 
alleged that, in some circumstances, German courts order full 
custodianship to afford family members the freedom to holistically act on 
behalf of their relatives despite the fact that the requirements of full 
custodianship may not be strictly met.67 Family members are often 
unaware that persons placed under full custodianship automatically lose the 
right to vote and generally do not intend this consequence.68 Political 
parties in Germany have petitioned the government to compile statistics on 
the exact number of persons under full custodianship several times, but the 
government has failed to do so.69 
Advocates for inclusive electoral law have stated that the government 
has prevented an estimated 12,000 people with intellectual or psychological 
disabilities from taking part in elections because they are under full 
custodianship.70 Based on the 2013 federal elections projections, the 
Institute of Federal Statistics confirmed that approximately 61.8 million 
Germans are eligible to vote.71 These two figures suggest that section 13(2) 
of the FEL excludes around 0.00019 percent of the German population 
from voting. Given these projections, it is highly doubtful that granting the 
right to vote to persons under full custodianship will endanger the 
functioning of the German democratic state. The fact that not all those 
falling within the scope of section 13(2) of the FEL, such as comatose 
patients, will be able to exercise the right to vote, even if they wanted to 
vote, further illuminates this point.72 Therefore, arguing that section 13(2) 
 66.  Leander Palleit, Deutschland Braucht Endlich ein Inklusives Wahlrecht, 
AKTUELL: DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR MENSCHENRECHTE, (May 2012), at 2 (Ger.), 
available at http://www.behindertenbeauftragte.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/ 
Wahlrecht_Monitoringstelle.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.  
 67.  BRK-Allianz Submission, supra note 61, at 14.  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Jentsch, Behinderung, supra note 58, at 4.  
 70.  Klaus Lachwitz, Engaging MPs in Law Reform to Secure the Right to Vote 
in Germany, INT’L DISABILITY ALLIANCE HUM. RTS. PUBLICATION, Mar. 2013, at 
2, available at http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/sites/disalliance.e- 
presentaciones.net/files/public/files/Engaging%20MPs%20in%20Law%20Reform
%20to%20Secure%20the%20Right%20to%20Vote%20in%20Germany.pdf; see 
 Palleit, Deutschland, supra note 66, at 14 (noting that only a small fraction of the 
1.3 million individuals under some form of custodianship are under full 
custodianship and thus unable to vote).  
 71.  Pressemitteilung 21. Februar 2013 61,8 Millionen Wahlberechtigte, 
BUNDESWAHLLEITER, (Feb. 2013), (Ger.), http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/ 
bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_13/presse/w13001_Wahlberechtigte.html. 
 72.  PALLEIT, GLEICHES, supra note 54, at 14. 
 
  
328 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [30:2 
of the FEL safeguards democratic elections is misguided and unreasonable. 
In addition, full custodianship is not an “objective” criterion for 
excluding German citizens from voting because it leads to treating similar 
cases arbitarily. As mentioned above, people placed under full 
custodianship are excluded from exercising the right to vote.73 However, 
the legislation does not apply to those who have privately identified an 
individual to conduct their affairs through a power of attorney.74 These 
persons maintain the right to vote despite the fact that they may be as 
unable to take care of their own affairs and allegedly make rational voting 
decisions as people under full custodianship.75 The legislators have failed 
to explain why these two groups of persons with disabilities are treated 
differently. Seemingly, the only basis for including one and excluding the 
other from voting is that the former privately designates his legal custodian 
while German courts impose custodianship on the latter. Therefore this 
differentiation is arbitrary and not “objective.” 
2. Disenfranchisement of Persons Under Full Custodianship Because 
Their Participation Increases the Risk of Electoral Manipulations 
Some commentators argue that allowing persons under full 
custodianship to vote increases the risk of voting manipulation because 
such person will likely require assistance while voting.76 They explain that 
individuals providing electoral support could unduly influence the voting 
decisions of persons under full custodianship or override votes altogether 
by replacing them with their own.77 They warn that such electoral 
 73.  See supra Section I. 
 74.  Hellmann, Der Ausschluss vom Wahlrecht, supra note 61. 
 75.  Bundesverband Selbsthilfe Körperbehinderter e.V., Stellungnahme des 
Bundesverbands Körperbehinderter e.V. zu den parlamentarischen Initiativen zur 
Änderung des Bundeswahlgesetzes von Menschen mit geistiger Behinderung, 
(May 28, 2013), AUSSCHUSSDRUCKSACHEN [AD] 17(4)743 D, 7 (Ger.); cf. BRK-
Allianz Submission, supra note 61, at 15 (contending that automatically excluding 
persons under full custodianship from voting is “not appropriate” and “contravenes 
the principle of equal participation in political life[,]” particularly because not all 
persons with disabilities are excluded from voting).  
 76.  Palleit, Deutschland, supra note 66, at 2 (describing that often vote 
misappropriation is a major argument against law reform on the matter).  
 77.  See M. Redley et al., The Voting Rights of Adults with Intellectual 
Disabilities: Reflections on the Arguments, and Situation in Kenya and England 
and Wales, 56 J.I.D.R. 1026, 1028 (2012) (noting that commentators are concerned 
that the susceptibility of voters to manipulation is exacerbated in States providing 
voting assistance to persons with disabilities).  
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manipulations could cause vote misappropriation.78 For these reasons, 
these commentators argue that excluding persons under full custodianship 
from voting is “reasonable” and “objective.” 
This argument, however, is not a “reasonable” justification for denying 
persons with disabilities the right to vote. While persons under full 
custodianship may require assistance when voting, this does not necessarily 
mean that those assisting them will manipulate their votes. This assumes 
that all persons under full custodianship are particularly vulnerable and 
easy to manipulate.79 This generalization is discriminatory. Even if it were 
accurate, establishing transparent support procedures to overcome or 
reduce possible risks would be preferable to denying the right of persons 
under full custodianship to vote altogether.80 
In addition, the argument that the possibility of vote manipulation 
necessitates excluding persons under full custodianship from voting is not 
“objective” because it overlooks the fact that other groups of people in need 
of voting assistance receive the required support instead of losing their right 
to vote. For example, in Germany, according to article 57 of the Federal 
Electoral Regulations, persons who are disabled or illiterate are permitted 
to bring a support person into the electoral booth to assist them in marking, 
folding, and submitting the ballot.81 Moreover, article 62 Federal Electoral 
 78.  Id. at 1028; see Heinrich Lang, Staatsbürgerliche Partizipation von 
Menschen mit Behinderung, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 133, [135] 
(2013) (Ger.). 
 79.  Contra Palleit, Deutschland, supra note 66, at 2 (arguing that even if 
allowing persons under full custodianship to vote would create a greater risk of 
abuse, such risk does not justify depriving persons with disabilities their 
fundamental rights). 
 80.  Article 12 of the CRPD explicitly requires States parties to implement such 
safeguards to address the vote manipulation issue. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 12(4) 
(“States parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal 
capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse . . . Such 
safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity 
respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest 
and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, 
apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a 
competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The safeguards 
shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person’s 
rights and interests.”). 
 81.  Bundeswahlordnung [BWO] [Federal Electoral Regulations], Apr. 19, 
2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL. I] at 1376, as amended May 13, 2013, 
BGBL. I at 1255, § 57 (Ger.), translated in Federal Electoral Regulations (BWO), 
BUNDESWAHLLEITER, http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/ 
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Regulations permits patients in small hospitals and nursing homes to cast 
their vote remotely rather than travel to a voting center.82 While the risk of 
vote manipulation in the cases above and for persons under full 
custodianship may be equally prevalent, German electoral regulations only 
accommodate the former. 
In fact, the legislature permits voting procedures that present a greater 
risk of vote manipulation under those circumstances than in the case of 
persons under full custodianship. For example, in the 2009 federal election, 
over nine million people, or around 21.4 percent of the eligible German 
voters, cast their ballots through the post.83  In this instance, the risk of vote 
manipulations is substantially greater because it exposes a larger number of 
votes to third-party manipulation. Nevertheless, the German Constitutional 
Court declared postal votes constitutional.84 Therefore, the risk of vote 
manipulation rationale is indiscriminately applied only to persons under 
full custodianship. 
B. MENTAL INCAPACITY AS A “REASONABLE RESTRICTION” 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 25 OF THE ICCPR 
The previous subsection concluded that the two reasons for 
automatically excluding persons under full custodianship from voting are 
neither based on “objective” nor “reasonable” criteria.85 Therefore, section 
13(2) of the FEL does not comply with the HRC’s test for permissibly 
restricting the right to vote under article 25 of the ICCPR. However, the 
HRC’s statements in other parts of Comment 25 may suggest otherwise. 
The HRC’s interpretation of the ICCPR is an authoritative source of 
international human rights law.86 In 1996, the HRC explicitly identified 
“established mental incapacity” as a valid criterion for denying a person’s 
right to vote.87 This suggests that section 13(2) of the FEL permits 
downloads/rechtsgrundlagen/bundeswahlordnung_engl.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 
2014).  
 82.  Id. § 62.  
 83.  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT], Jan. 16, 
2013, 17/12068 (4) (Ger.).  
 84.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 
15, 1967, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 924, 1967 (Ger.).  
 85.  See discussion supra Section IIIA. 
 86.  Human Rights Committee: Introduction, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2014). 
 87.  CCPR General Comment 25, supra note 50, ¶ 4. 
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excluding persons under full custodianship from voting may be consistent 
with international human rights law. Germany takes this view and argues 
that the HRC’s interpretation of article 25 of the ICCPR is “universally 
accepted” and allows Germany to exclude persons under full custodianship 
from voting based on the objective “legal capacity” criterion without 
violating international human rights law.88 However, State parties to the 
ICCPR could no longer rely on the HRC’s 1996 interpretation of 
“reasonable restrictions” if this interpretation were outdated and article 25 
of the ICCPR would have to be interpreted differently today in light of the 
adoption of more recent human rights standards relating to disabilities and 
the right to vote. Such “modern” human rights standards possibly requiring 
a different interpretation of article 25 of the ICCPR could be contained in 
article 29 of the CRPD. 
1. Incapacity as a Reasonable Restriction on the Right to Vote Under 
Article 29 of the CRPD 
Article 29 of the CRPD expressly stipulates that States must guarantee 
persons with disabilities “the free expression of [their] will as electors.”89 
Unlike article 25 of the ICCPR,90 this provision does not explicitly permit 
restricting the right of persons with disabilities to vote.91 This suggests that 
established mental incapacity is not a legitimate reason to exclude 
individuals from electoral participation. However, in a statement prepared 
for the German Parliament on this topic, Gerd Strohmeier made the 
following observations. He reasoned that article 29 of the CRPD does not 
contain permissible restrictions on the right to vote only because the 
provision would become too detailed otherwise. He contends the absence 
of explicit restrictions of the CRPD does not mean that restrictions are 
inadmissible.92 
  
 88.  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT], Nov. 8, 
2008, 16/10808 (64) (Ger.). 
 89.  CRPD, supra note 1, art. 29. 
 90.  ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 25. 
 91.  CRPD, supra note 1, art. 29. 
 92.  Gerd Strohmeier, Stellungnahme für die öffentliche Anhörung des 
Innenausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages zum Gesetzentwurf BT-Drs. 
17/12068 und zum Antrag BT-Drs. 17/12380, Jun. 3 2013, 
AUSSCHUSSDRUCKSACHEN [AD] 17(4)744 E, 7-8 (Ger.). 
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To determine whether article 29 of the CRPD implicitly allows 
restricting the right to vote on the basis of incapacity, the rules of treaty 
interpretation outlined in article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) are applied below.93 Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention states that a treaty provision must be interpreted in light 
of its ordinary meaning, the overall object and purpose of the treaty,94 and 
subsequent practice regarding the application of the treaty.95  The provision 
must be interpreted in good faith to ensure that the interpretation does not 
lead to an absurd result.96  Based on these principles, the interpretation of 
article 29 of the CRPD affirms that the article, neither explicitly nor 
implicitly, permits restricting the right of persons with disabilities to vote 
on the basis of an “established mental incapacity.” 
When assessing the ordinary meaning of a treaty provision, the terms of 
the article must be read in light of its conventional meaning.97 As discussed 
earlier, article 29 of the CRPD provides that State parties shall undertake to 
“ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in 
political and public life on an equal basis with others, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives, including the right and opportunity for 
persons with disabilities to vote and be elected.”98 As the language of the 
article enunciates a positive right to vote without explicitly including 
restrictions, the ordinary meaning of article 29 of the CRPD suggests that 
State parties cannot automatically restrict the right to vote based on 
“established mental incapacity” or court-ordered full custodianship. 
 93.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 94.  Id. art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose.”); see generally ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE 
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED 
IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 203-35 (2007) 
(outlining how to analyze ordinary meaning, object and purpose, and 
supplementary means of interpretation). 
 95.  See VCLT, supra note 93, art. 31(3)(a)-(b) (stating that “[a]ny subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions” and “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of 
the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation” shall be accounted for when interpreting a treaty). 
 96.  See LINDERFALK, supra note 94, at 44-45; see VCLT, supra note 93, art. 
31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith.”). 
 97.  LINDERFALK, supra note 94, at 62, 66 (arguing that the conventional 
language concept encompasses both everyday and technical language). 
 98.  CRPD, supra note 1, art. 29. 
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To determine whether the overall “context” of the CRPD supports this 
interpretation of article 29, the treaty’s “object” and “purpose” must be 
determined first. As discussed earlier, the CRPD was the first international 
legally binding instrument relating to persons with disabilities.99 The UN 
Secretary General noted that the CRPD demonstrated the “dawn of a new 
era—an era in which disabled people will no longer have to endure the 
discriminatory practices and attitudes that have been permitted to prevail 
for all too long.”100 Article 1 of the treaty reflects this notion and provides 
that the primary purpose of the CRPD is to “promote, protect and ensure 
the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent 
dignity.”101 Article 3 further elaborates that the CRPD was adopted to 
foster the respect for “inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the 
freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons,” to 
promote “non-discrimination,” to enable “full and effective participation 
and inclusion in society,” to create “respect for difference and acceptance 
of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity and humanity,” and 
to ensure the “equality of opportunity.”102 
These aims illustrate that the CRPD was introduced to break away from 
the dominant perception that persons with disabilities are consumers of 
welfare and/or medical services, rather than right-holders and active 
members of society.103 The Convention’s object is, therefore, to shift from 
the traditional “welfare” approach to a “rights-based” approach with 
respect to persons with disabilities.104 Accordingly, some commentators 
 99.  See supra Section III. 
 100.  Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Hails Adoption 
of Landmark Convention on Rights of People with Disabilities, SG/SM/10797, 
HR/4911, L/T/4400 (Dec. 13, 2006). 
 101.  CRPD, supra note 1, art. 1. 
 102.  Id. art. 3. 
 103.  United Nations, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Handbook 
for Parliamentarians on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
and its Optional Protocol: From Exclusion to Equality - Realizing the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/07/6 (2007); see Don MacKay, The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 323, 328 (2007); Michael Waterstone, The 
Significance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (stating that “the 
Convention envisions people with disabilities as full citizens seeking to make their 
own decisions about their lives[,]” instead of treating them through a medical lens 
and making objects of pity). 
 104.  See Redley et al., supra note 77, at 1026-27 (emphasizing that this shift 
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have referred to article 3 as a “moral compass for change.”105 Ultimately, 
the CRPD’s object and purpose to promote an inclusive and non-
discriminatory “rights-based” approach to persons with disabilities support 
the interpretation that article 29 does not permit restricting the right to vote 
on the basis of established incapacity. 
Subsequent practice of applying the CRPD confirms this interpretation. 
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (“Committee”) 
recommendations and statements best reflect subsequent practice.106 They 
are effective tools for interpreting the CRPD because the Committee is 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the CRPD by reviewing 
periodic state reports and providing authoritative interpretations of its 
provisions.107 When reviewing periodic state reports, the Committee has 
consistently confirmed that incapacity is not a valid basis for restricting the 
right of persons with disabilities to vote under article 29 of the CRPD.108 
In 2011, the Committee reviewed Spain’s electoral legislation, which is 
similar to Germany’s, and expressed concern that the laws restricted the 
right of persons with disabilities to vote merely because such persons were 
does not grant persons with disabilities new rights but rather guarantees rights 
already protected under the UDHR). 
 105.  E.g. Gerard Quinn, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities: Toward a New International Politics of Disability, 15 
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 33, 41 (2009). 
 106.  CRPD, supra note 1, art. 34 (establishing the committee and setting out its 
responsibilities). 
 107.  See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Questions and 
Answers, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2014) (explaining 
the responsibilities of the Committee). The authoritative interpretations of treaty 
bodies, such as the Committee, reflect subsequent practice pursuant to article 
31(3)(b) of the VCLT. Christopher Keith Hall, The Duty of States Parties to the 
Convention Against Torture to Provide Procedures Permitting Victims to Recover 
Reparations for Torture Committed Abroad, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 921, 927 (2007); 
Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 905, 920 (2009) (noting that subsequent practice pursuant 
to the VCLT cannot only be limited to state practice because of the “special role” 
of human rights treaty bodies). 
 108.  E.g. U.N. Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Spain, 
¶¶ 47-48, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1 (Oct. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Concluding 
Observations: Spain] (stating that legal capacity is not a valid basis for excluding 
persons from the right to vote, particularly because judges decide such matters 
without standards of evidence, grounds, or explicit criteria). 
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deprived of their legal capacity.109  The Committee recommended that the 
government amend its legislation to afford all persons the right to vote 
regardless of their legal capacity.110 The Committee also recommended this 
to Argentina, Peru, and Tunisia.111 These recommendations confirm article 
29 of the CRPD does not permit automatically excluding persons from 
electoral participation on the basis of “established mental incapacity.” 
2. Re-interpreting Article 25 of the ICCPR Through Article 29 of the 
CRPD 
As concluded above, article 29 of the CRPD does not accept 
“established mental incapacity” as a valid basis for restricting the right to 
vote. However, HRC Comment 25 finds that an “established mental 
incapacity” is a valid basis. Commentators have debated the relationship 
between these two instruments. Some argue that article 25 of the ICCPR 
explicitly allows restricting the right to vote on the basis of “established 
mental incapacity” and that article 29 of the CRPD cannot derogate from 
this valid restriction.112 In a statement prepared for the German Parliament 
on suggested changes to FEL and persons with disabilities, Heinrich Lang 
contends article 29 of the CRPD does not automatically amend article 25 of 
the ICCPR because the lex posterior rule, which provides that a later law 
supersedes a prior law, does not apply in international law.113 Similarly, 
Strohmeier argues article 29 of the CRPD does not establish new rights for 
persons with disabilities because it is only intended to replicate the content 
of article 25 of the ICCPR.114 Therefore, he argues restricting the right to 
vote on the basis of “established mental capacity” is still permitted under 
 109.  Id. ¶ 47. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  U.N. Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding 
Observations on the Initial Report of Argentina as Approved by the Committee at 
its Eighth Session, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/ARG/CO/1 (Oct. 8, 2012) [hereinafter 
Concluding Observations: Argentina]; U.N. Comm. on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities: Peru, ¶ 45(a), U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/PER/CO/1 (Apr. 20, 2012) 
[hereinafter Concluding Observations: Peru]; U.N. Comm. on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Tunisia, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 
(May 13, 2011) [hereinafter Concluding Observations: Tunisia]. 
 112.  Lang, Stellungnahme, supra note 55, at 8; Strohmeier, supra note 92 at 8.  
 113.  Lang, Stellungnahme, supra note 55, at 8.  
 114.  Strohmeier, supra note 92 at 8.  
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article 25 of the ICCPR, regardless of article 29 of the CRPD.115 
However, these arguments ignore the fact that article 25 of the ICCPR 
does not expressly stipulate that restricting the right to vote of persons with 
“established mental incapacity” is reasonable.116 Rather, it was the HRC 
that concluded that an “established mental incapacity” is a “reasonable 
restriction” under article 25 of the ICCPR.117 Thus, article 29 of the CRPD 
does not amend article 25 of the ICCPR but rather alters the HRC’s 
interpretation of “reasonable restrictions.” As the more recent and legally 
binding instrument, the CRPD has a higher legal status than the outdated 
HRC comment.118 In adopting article 29 of the CRPD, State parties have 
amended and further developed the earlier interpretation of “reasonable 
restrictions” and incapacity.119 In doing so, they have established that 
excluding persons from voting simply on the basis of their incapacity is no 
longer a “reasonable restriction” under article 25 of the ICCPR.120 
The High Commissioner for Human Rights (“High Commissioner”) 
affirmed that HRC’s Comment 25 is outdated because the “legal 
landscape” with respect to persons with disabilities changed when States 
adopted the CRPD.121 The High Commissioner called upon the HRC to 
reinterpret article 25 of the ICCPR and to revise its Comment 25 so that 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 25 (stating that every citizen has the right 
to vote without “unreasonable restrictions”). 
 117.  CCPR General Comment 25, supra note 50, ¶ 4 (“The exercise of these 
rights by citizens may not be suspended or excluded except on grounds which are 
established by law and which are objective and reasonable. For example, 
established mental incapacity may be a ground for denying a person the right to 
vote or to hold office.”). 
 118.  See Int’l Disability Alliance, Contribution to OHCHR Thematic Study on 
“The participation of pers. with disabilities in political and pub. life”, 10, (Oct. 15, 
2011) [hereinafter IDA Contribution to OHCHR Study], available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Disability/Pages/StudyPoliticalAndPublicLife.asp
x (arguing that the “legal landscape has changed” since the HRC first adopted its 
Comment 25 because the CRPD was adopted). 
 119.  PALLEIT, GLEICHES, supra note 54, at 5-7.  
 120.  See Valentin Aichele, Stellungnahme der Monitoring-Stelle zur UN-
Behindertenrechtskonvention anlässlich der öffentlichen Anhörung des 
Innenausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages, Jun. 3, 2013,  
AUSSCHUSSDRUCKSACHEN [AD] 17(4)744 D, 8-9 (Ger.). 
 121.  Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights, Thematic 
Study on participation in political and pub. life by pers. with disabilities, ¶ 7, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/18/36 (Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter OHCHR Thematic Study]; see 
IDA Contribution to OHCHR Study, supra note 118 (discussing the change in the 
“legal landscape”). 
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both reflect the evolution of the rights of persons with disabilities.122 Even a 
member of the HRC, Theresia Degener, adopted this view, opining that 
Comment 25 and the exclusion of the right to vote based on “incapacity” 
may no longer meet the modern understanding of voting capacity 
contained in the CRPD.123 
These arguments suggest that  State parties can no longer legitimately 
rely on the HRC’s interpretation of article 25 of the ICCPR to justify 
legislation that automatically excludes persons from voting merely based 
on their incapacity. Consequently, Germany cannot insist that section 13(2) 
of the FEL complies with international human rights law.124 The German 
CRPD Monitoring Body, Deutsches Menschenrechtsinstitut, has 
continuously expressed this view, arguing that section 13(2) of the FEL 
does not comply with international human rights law because it is 
discriminatory and arbitrary.125 
IV. ACTIONS THAT NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS SHOULD TAKE TO 
FULLY COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES TO VOTE 
A. CONDUCT ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
To comply with international human rights standards, Germany must 
revise its current legislation so that it no longer automatically excludes 
individuals from voting solely based on established incapacity. One option 
may be to empower courts to individually assess a person’s capacity to 
make rational voting decisions during the process of ordering full 
custodianship. Alternatively, the legislators could repeal section 13(2) of 
 122.  OHCHR Thematic Study, supra note 121, ¶ 71 (noting that Comment 25 
should be reviewed in relation to “the right to participate in public affairs, voting 
rights and the right of equal access to public service”). 
 123.  Degener, The Right to Political Participation, supra note 22, at 2 (“[T]his 
General Comment dates back to 1996, one decade before the CRPD was adopted 
and there is reason to believe that there is a growing readiness to revise the 
traditional understanding of voting capacity.”). 
 124.  Meyer, supra note 59; cf. Degener, From Exclusion to Universality, supra 
note 22, at 1 (arguing that the de facto denial of voting rights of persons with 
disabilities is one of the most serious human rights violations). 
 125.  Palleit, Deutschland, supra note 66, at 3.  
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the FEL and allow citizens to exercise the right to vote without any 
restrictions. 
1. Individual Assessment of the “Fitness to Vote” 
Legislation mandating courts to individually assess a person’s ability to 
make rational voting decisions in the custodianship process may arguably 
comply with international human rights law.126 Such legislation would not 
automatically exclude persons with disabilities from voting because of their 
legal incapacity. Rather, it would require courts to assess a person’s ability 
to vote and to deny a person’s right to vote only if the court deems him 
“unfit.” The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) condoned this 
view on several occasions.127 
In Kiss v. Hungary, the ECtHR assessed Hungary’s absolute voting ban, 
which had prevented persons with mental disabilities under partial 
custodianship from being included in the electoral register.128 The ECtHR 
held that categorically excluding persons with disabilities from voting 
without individually assessing them violated article 3 of the First Optional 
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).129 
Furthermore, the EctHR did not suggest legislation mandating judicial and 
individual assessments of the right to vote would be incompatible with 
human rights.130 On the contrary, it argued Member States may restrict the 
right to vote on a number of grounds.131 This suggests section 13(2) of the 
FEL could better comply with the rights of persons with disabilities if 
 126.  See Sabine Jentsch, Demokratie & Wahlrechtsausschluss: Kritische 
Anmerkungen zu § 13 Nr. 2 des deutschen Bundeswahlgesetzes, 2 MOMENTUM Q. 
150, 161 (2013) (Ger.) (summarizing the view of these commentators without 
agreeing with them).  
 127.  See, e.g., Kiss v. Hungary (No.2), App. No. 38832/06, ¶¶ 42-44 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. May 20, 2010) (HUDOC), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/ 
pages/search.aspx?i=001-98800; Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 681, 693 (stating that the principle of proportionality provides that 
disenfranchisement requires a sufficient link with the circumstances of the 
individual concerned).  
 128.  Kiss, App. No. 38832/06 at ¶ 42-43. 
 129.  Id. Contra PALLEIT, GLEICHES, supra note 54, at 13 (arguing that a voting 
eligibility test is inconsistent with the ECHR). 
 130.  Id. ¶ 44 (stating that without an individualized judicial evaluation, an 
indiscriminate removal of voting rights cannot be considered a legitimate ground 
for restricting the right to vote). 
 131.  Id. ¶ 38 (“[A] wide range of purposes [to restrict the right to vote] may . . . 
be compatible with Article 3 [of the ECHR]”). 
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Germany mandated courts to individually assess a person’s fitness to vote 
when determining custodianship.132 
However, such legislation would not meet the HRC’s “objective” and 
“reasonable” threshold and would contradict the international human rights 
standards enumerated in article 25 of the ICCPR and article 29 of the 
CRPD. Requiring persons under full custodianship to show that they can 
make rational voting decisions to exercise the right to vote is not 
“objective” because it is indiscriminately applied in three ways.  First, 
German electors have the right to vote in elections but also have the right to 
refrain from doing so.133 Nonetheless, commentators have argued that 
comatose patients should not maintain their right to vote because they will 
not exercise it.134 All other voters in Germany are free to refrain from 
voting without losing their right to do so; therefore, it is unclear why 
comatose patients should be treated differently.135 
Second, the right to vote in Germany does not preclude voters from 
voting spontaneously, irrationally, invalidly, or without political 
knowledge.136 German voters are free to base their votes on non-rational 
political or personal reasons, such as sympathy or antipathy for certain 
political figures, or traditional voting inclinations of certain socio-economic 
groups.137 Making voting decisions in this manner does not disqualify 
German electors from voting. It is discriminatory to require only persons 
under full custodianship to make valid and rational voting decisions and 
test them on it. 
Third, testing the fitness of persons with disabilities to vote is a 
discriminatory practice in itself.138 Assessing persons under full 
 132.  See id. ¶ 41 (agreeing with the Hungarian government “that it must be 
permissible for the legislature to establish rules ensuring that only those who are 
capable of assessing the consequences of their decisions and making conscious and 
judicious decisions should participate in public affairs”). 
 133.  See BASIC LAW, supra note 34, art. 38(2) (granting individuals the right to 
vote, rather than imposing a duty to do so). 
 134.  Jentsch, Demokratie & Wahlrechtsausschluss, supra note 126 at 161; 
Lang, Staatsbürgerliche, supra note 78, at 136; Strohmeier, supra note 92, at 7. 
 135.  Jentsch, Demokratie & Wahlrechtsausschluss, supra note 126 at 161-162.  
 136.  Jentsch, Behinderung, supra note 58, at 8; Palleit, Deutschland, supra note 
66, at 1; PALLEIT, GLEICHES, supra note 54, at 13.  
 137.  See Redley et al., supra note 77, at 1027-28 (noting that voters often vote 
based on their “telegenic qualities” or “traditional loyalties associated with class, 
religion, ethnicity or tribe”); see also Jentsch, Behinderung, supra note 58, at 8.  
 138.  See, e.g., IDA Contribution to OHCHR Study, supra note 118, at 4 
(arguing that testing for proper voting judgment is discriminatory because the 
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custodianship before allowing them to vote converts the right into a 
privilege a person can only exercise if he meets certain criteria. Moreover, 
the government does not test the capacity of other German voters to make 
rational political decisions before elections. As Thomas Hammerberg, the 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, contends, there is “no 
room for procedures in which judges or medical practitioners would assess 
the voting competence of a person and then give a green light—or not.”139 
He further elaborated that it would “amount to blatant discrimination” 
because the government does not test the capabilities of a person without 
disabilities.140 
In addition, individually assessing a person’s capacity is not 
“reasonable” because the specific selection criteria for such individualized 
assessments remain unclear. Supporters have not defined the requisite 
threshold that makes a person fit to make rational voting decisions and elect 
‘better’ governments.141 Will persons under full custodianship be required 
to prove a rational understanding comparable to that of an “average” 
rational German voter? If so, who is an “average” rational German elector? 
Legislation requiring the government to individually assess persons with 
disabilities’ fitness to vote in the custodianship process before granting 
them the right to vote is not based on “reasonable” and “objective” criteria 
and therefore does not comply with article 25 of the ICCPR. Indeed, article 
29 of the CRPD and the Committee’s interpretation support this view.142 
As discussed earlier, article 29 of the CRPD does not allow any 
government only applies the test to persons with disabilities and not the whole 
general population). 
 139.  Hammarberg: “No Room” For Removing Right to Vote, MENTAL 
DISABILITY ADVOC. CTR., http://www.mdac.info/en/content/hammarberg-%E2% 
80%9Cno-room%E2%80%9D-removing-right-vote (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Cf. Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Communication No. 
4/2011, Views adopted by the Comm. at its tenth sess. (2-13 Sept. 2013), ¶ 5.8, 
U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011 (Sept. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Communication No. 
4/2011] (noting that the Harvard Law School Project on Disability argues that 
“[t]here is no scientifically determinable cut-off point between persons having and 
those lacking capacity to vote[,]” and thus individualized “assessments will always 
result in disenfranchisement of at least some capable voters with disabilities.”); 
Concluding Observations: Spain, supra note 108, ¶ 47 (rejecting legal capacity as a 
basis for excluding persons from voting partially because judges do not follow a 
set standard when deciding these cases). 
 142.  See Jentsch, Behinderung, supra note 58, at 4, 11 (affirming that excluding 
persons from political participation is not acceptable under both the ICCPR and 
CRPD).  
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differentiation of the right to vote on the basis of incapacity or other 
disabilities because the provision aims to create an inclusive electoral 
system.143 In fact, the drafters intentionally omitted any differentiations in 
the CRPD because such differentiations would be arbitrary and 
discriminatory.144 The Committee has requested specific States that permit 
restricting the right to vote based on incapacity to amend their respective 
legislation to ensure all persons with disabilities have the right to vote.145 
For instance, in 2013, the Committee was tasked with assessing 
Hungarian legislation excluded persons under guardianship from voting.146 
In what Human Rights Watch calls a “landmark” decision,147 the 
Committee emphasized: 
[a]rticle 29 does not foresee any reasonable restriction, nor does it allow 
any exception for any group of persons with disabilities. Therefore, an 
exclusion of the right to vote on the basis of a perceived, or actual 
psychosocial or intellectual disability, including a restriction pursuant to 
an individualized assessment, constitutes discrimination on the basis of 
disability, within the meaning of article 2 of the Convention.148 
Similarly, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights opined 
legislation restricting the right of persons with disabilities to vote is 
incompatible with current perceptions of democracy and non-
discrimination.149 Therefore, legislation that restricts voting based on 
individual assessments of persons with disabilities does not comply with 
 143.  See supra Section III. 
 144.  Cf. PALLEIT, GLEICHES, supra note 54, at 13 (arguing a blanket exclusion 
of persons with disabilities from voting violates the CRPD).  
 145.  E.g., Concluding Observations: Argentina, supra note 111, ¶ 48; 
Concluding Observations: Peru, supra note 111, ¶ 45; Concluding Observations: 
Spain, supra note 108, ¶¶ 47–48; Concluding Observations: Tunisia, supra note 
111, ¶ 35. 
 146.  Communication No. 4/2011, supra note 141. 
 147.  Hungary: Change Discriminatory Voting Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 3, 
2013) http://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2013/10/01/hungary-change-discriminatory-voting-laws. 
 148.  Communication No. 4/2011, supra note 141, ¶ 9.4. See generally Robert 
D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road From 
Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 9 (2012) 
(arguing that “even people with the most significant disabilities have legal capacity 
and are covered by the CRPD” pursuant to article 12 of the CRPD).  
 149.  OHCHR Thematic Study, supra note 121, ¶ 7. 
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article 29 of the CRPD.150 Accordingly, amending the German FEL to 
require individual assessments is not sufficient. International human rights 
law pursuant to article 25 of the ICCPR and article 29 of the CRPD 
requires Germany to revoke section 13(2) of the FEL and grant all persons 
under full custodianship the right to vote regardless of their capacity to 
rationally do so.151 
2. An Unrestricted Right to Vote 
Those who oppose repealing section 13(2) of the FEL have argued that 
doing so would compromise democratic elections and democracy in 
general.152 However, primary research studies do not support this 
assumption. While research in this particular area is neither extensive nor 
conclusive, two studies suggest that the participation of persons with 
disabilities in elections are unlikely to alter electoral results.153 Klein and 
Grossmann, for example, analyzed the voting patterns of mental patients in 
a New York hospital through mock ballots and concluded that the results 
largely resembled those of the surrounding district.154 Similarly, Wellner 
and Gaines conducted a subsequent study on the voting outcomes of 
 150.  See Degener, The Right to Political Participation, supra note 22, at 2 
(stressing that article 29 of the CRPD ensures that “all disabled persons, no matter 
what their impairment is, have an equal right to participate in the electoral 
process”). This article does not discuss the actual measures that must be taken to 
support persons under full custodianship when voting. Others, however, have 
discussed this issue. See, e.g. BREMISCHE BÜRGERSCHAFT: DRUCKSACHEN UND 
PROTOKOLLE [BT], Oct. 29, 2013, Drs. 18/1190 (Ger.) (assessing the possibility of 
writing electoral material in simpler language).  
 151.  See BRK-Allianz Submission, supra note 61, at 15 (stating that section 
13(2) of the FEL must be repealed and not replaced); Hellmann, Der Ausschluss 
vom Wahlrecht, supra note 61, at 6 (arguing that Germany is required to change its 
legislation because it is a signatory of the CRPD); Ulrich Hellmann, Zur 
Vereinbarkeit des Wahlrechtsausschlusses nach § 13(2) BWG mit bestehenden 
völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtungen, BETREUUNGSRECHTLICHE PRAXIS [BTPRAX] 
208, 212 (2010) (Ger.) (calling on German legislators to amend the FEL so that it 
provides equal voting rights to persons with disabilities pursuant to the CRPD); 
Palleit, Deutschland, supra note 66, at 2 (agreeing that the discrimination under § 
13(2) of the FEL must end).  
 152.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 153.  Morris M. Klein & Saul A. Grossman, Voting Pattern of Mental Patients 
in a Community State Hospital, 3 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 149, 149-52 
(1967); Alfred M. Wellner & Lawrence S. Gaines, Patients’ Right to Vote, 21 
HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 163, 163-64 (1970). 
 154.  Klein & Grossman, supra note 153, at 149-52 as discussed in Appelbaum, 
supra note 62, at 850. 
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patients in a psychiatric hospital in Maryland and the patients’ voting 
preferences also resembled those of their socio-economic counterparts in 
other parts of Maryland.155 
The experiences of Germany’s neighboring states, Austria and the 
Netherlands, also demonstrate that unrestricted voting participation does 
not automatically lead to the fall of the democratic state. Until 1987, 
Austrian electoral legislation provided that people under custodianship 
were automatically excluded from voting.156 The Austrian Constitutional 
Court found the legislation violated the right to equality and held it 
unconstitutional.157 Austria has not enacted any new legislation since then 
and, as such, all people in Austria have the right to vote now regardless of 
established incapacity or fitness to vote.158 Similarly, the Dutch 
government repealed legislation that prohibited persons without legal 
capacity to vote in 2008 because it did not comply with the ICCPR.159 
Nothing indicates that elections in the Netherlands and Austria have 
become less democratic since their respective governments repealed these 
laws. 
3. The Likelihood that Germany will Review the FEL 
While Germany would need to repeal section 13(2) of the FEL to 
comply with the international human rights law on disabilities, this appears 
to be an unrealistic goal for three reasons. First, politicians are not 
optimistic about the effects of repealing the law. In early 2013, the German 
Green Party and Social Democratic Party called on Parliament to amend 
FEL to establish an inclusive electoral system that complies with 
international human rights law.160 Parliament rejected both initiatives.161 
 155.  Wellner & Gaines, supra note 153 at 164 as discussed in Appelbaum, 
supra note 62 at 850. 
 156.  Eur. Union Agency for Fundamental Rts., The Right to Political 
Participation of Persons with Mental Health Problems and Person with 
Intellectual Disabilities, 19 (2010) [hereinafter The Right to Political 
Participation], available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2010-report-
vote-disability_en.pdf. 
 157.  Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] Oct. 7, 1987, 
ERKENNTNISSE UND BESCHLÜSSE DES VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSHOFS [VFSLG] No. 
11489 G109/87 (Austria) (holding that the Austrian law that excluded persons with 
disabilities from voting is unconstitutional).  
 158.  Palleit, Deutschland, supra note 66, at 4. 
 159.  Id.; The Right to Political Participation, supra note 156, at 18. 
 160.  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT], Jan. 16, 
2013, 17/12068 (4) (Ger.) (Green Party); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN 
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An article in  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a leading German 
newspaper, suggested that Parliament’s lack of interest in amending the 
electoral legislation may be related to the small amount of votes that 
parliamentarians could gain from such an amendment.162 In a statement 
prepared for the German Parliament on suggested changes to FEL and 
persons with disabilities, Hans Meyer agreed  and concluded that granting 
persons under full custodianship voting rights is not politically 
“attractive.”163 
Second, Germany has not faced much international pressure to repeal its 
electoral legislation. Germany reported to the Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (“Committee”) that section 13(2) of the FEL 
prevents persons under full custodianship from voting.164 However, 
Germany stated that the number of people excluded is kept “as small as 
possible” and that the provision only covers people who are unable to make 
“a highly-personal decision on who to vote for” on their own.165 The 
Committee has not commented on section 13(2) of the FEL and its 
compliance with international human rights law. 
Third, the German Government has asserted that the electoral legislation 
complies with international human rights law because the HRC’s 
Comment 25 finding “established mental incapacity” is a “reasonable” and 
“objective” criterion for excluding persons from voting is not outdated.166 
German academics have supported this view and contend that the 
Committee’s decisions do not necessarily affect the HRC’s interpretation in 
UND PROTOKOLLE [BT], Feb. 19, 2013, 17/12380 (Ger.) (Social Democratic Party). 
The Bundesrat (Federal Council) has also called for a similar initiative in favor of 
an inclusive electoral system. BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR], Jan. 29, 2013, 
49/13 (Ger.). 
 161.  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT], Oct. 19, 
2011, 17/132 (15637) (Ger.) (rejecting the Green Party’s concern about the FEL’s 
incompatibility with the CRPD, but agreeing to initiate a study to assess the need 
to improve the right of persons with disabilities to vote); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: 
DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT], June 27, 2013, 17/250 (31929) (Ger.) 
(rejecting the Social Democrat Party’s bill to amend the FEL). 
 162.  Oliver Tolmein, Stimmen Schenken!, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
ZEITUNG, Aug. 27, 2013, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/wahlrecht-
fuer-behinderte-stimmen-schenken-12546362.html.  
 163.  Meyer, supra note 59, at 4. 
 164.  U.N. Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Initial Reports of 
State Parties: Ger., U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/DEU/1 (May 7, 2013). 
 165.  Id. ¶ 253.  
 166.  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT], Nov. 8, 
2008, 16/10808 (63-64) (Ger.).  
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Comment 25.167 They argue that Committee recommendations calling on 
State parties to abandon legislation disqualifying persons under 
guardianship or lacking legal capacity from voting does not directly impact 
Germany’s compliance with international human rights law.168  
B. CONDUCT ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
Conduct on the international level may persuade Germany to review 
section 13(2) of the FEL. Germany is one of many States that prohibits 
persons under full custodianship from voting. The European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights identified sixteen Member States in which 
persons lacking legal capacity were automatically denied the right to 
vote.169 Ten Member States individually assessed persons with disabilities’ 
fitness to vote to determine their eligibility.170 Only ten member states 
granted persons with disabilities the unrestricted right to vote.171 These 
figures suggest that other member states, like Germany, may argue that the 
HRC’s Comment 25 is still applicable and continue to uphold their 
restrictive electoral laws with respect to persons with disabilities. 
Germany and these other European countries could be influenced to 
reassess their electoral laws should the HRC review and amend its 
interpretation of article 25 of the ICCPR regarding incapacity.172 
Amending Comment 25 would ensure State parties, like Germany, no 
longer legitimately rely on the outdated interpretation of that document to 
uphold their discriminatory electoral legislation and foster the shift from a 
“welfare” approach to a “rights-based” approach with respect to persons 
with disabilities on the international level. In revising its interpretation of 
 167. Strohmeier, supra note 92, at 7-8.  
 168.  Lang, Stellungnahme, supra note 55, at 8. 
 169.  The Right to Political Participation, supra note 156, at 16 (including 
Ireland, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Greece, and noting that certain countries fall into more than one of these categories 
because “persons with health problems and persons with intellectual disabilities 
can be treated differently according to the national law of the respective member 
state.”) 
 170.  Id. at 18 (Spain, France, Denmark, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Malta, 
Slovakia, Finland, Estonia, and Cyprus). 
 171.  Id. at 20 (Spain, Ireland, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Italy, 
Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Cyprus). 
 172.  See Degener, From Exclusion to Universality, supra note 22, at 4 
(suggesting that the HRC has begun to re-examine the issues of political 
participation and incapacity). 
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article 25 of the ICCPR, the HRC could contribute to promoting and 
protecting the rights of persons with disabilities and create an inclusive 
electoral system in State parties. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In adopting the CRPD, the international community explicitly 
recognized the importance of the non-discriminatory and inclusive 
treatment of persons with disabilities. This development ensured that 
disabilities are no longer “an invisible element of international human 
rights law.”173 Nevertheless, while disability rights are now prominent on 
the international level, domestic laws do not always comply with “modern” 
international human rights standards on disabilities. Article 13(2) of FEL, 
for example, does not comply with article 25 of the ICCPR and article 29 
of the CRPD because it automatically excludes persons under full 
custodianship from voting. 
To remedy this, Germany would have to repeal section 13(2) of the 
FEL, without replacing it with another legislation. However, this is unlikely 
because the German government has shown little interest in making such 
changes and has consistently relied on the HRC’s interpretation of article 
25 of the ICCPR to argue that FEL complies with international human 
rights law. Many other States have similar electoral laws and may also rely 
on the HRC’s outdated interpretation of the right to vote and refuse to 
amend their legislation. 
For these reasons, it is important to reassess the HRC’s interpretation of 
article 25 of the ICCPR and amend Comment 25 to further inclusive 
electoral systems in State parties. “[C]halleng[ing] common deep rooted 
stereotypes about intellectually and psycho-socially impaired individuals” 
is only possible if States continuously recognize the importance of persons 
with disabilities in all areas of social life.174 Ultimately, excluding persons 
with disabilities from political participation will only end when States 
abandon such stereotypes. 
 
 173.  Kayees & French, supra note 17, at 12; see Stein, supra note 17, at 12. 
 174.  Degener, The Right to Political Participation, supra note 22, at 3. 
 
